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TA" PROPER CANON OF INTERPRETATION OF BILLS OF
RIGHTS IN A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION.

I.

The Next Great Question of Constitutional Law.
WE hope there are few of our readers who have failed
to see Mr. MCMURTRIE'S interesting note entitled "Constitu-

tional Law," which appeared in the "Comments on Recent
Decisions" in the June number of this year. In this squib
the writer attacks what is called a "modem notion of constitutional law." To get a clear idea of what is meant by
this, the reader should turn to an article b.y the same
author in the January, number of the AMERICAN- LAW
REGISTER AND REVIEW, on a "New Canon of Constitutional Interpretation."
This article was a criticism of
certain expressions of opini6n by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the now celebrated case of Budd v. New
York.1 In that case it will be remembered the majority of
the Court held that the State of New York had the right
to fix the charges of grain elevators, because the business
is of a semi-public character, the reasoning being similar to
that employed in Munn v. Illinois.2 A minority of the
judges held that the business of conducting a grain elevator
was not public in the sense that a railroad business is
public, and that it was against the Constitution of the
United Staies for a State to regulate prices. The general
attitude of the Court is well expressed by Mr. MCMuRTRIE
when he says : "" And yet, while the sole question was the
power of a State to regulate prices charged by a grain
elevator, not one person, counsel or court, seems to have
started with the simple inquiry, Where is the clause in the
1 143 U. S., 517 (1892).
2 94 U. S., 113 (1876).

3 p. 5. Supra.
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Constitution which prohibits such a thing?

783 .
On the con-

trary, time-honored sentences from the Magna Charta,
supposed to be embodied in the Constitution of the United
States, was the nature of the argument relied on. And all we
can infer from the judgment is that it is not improper to apply
the principles of the.Magna Charta to exclude the power of
the State to name prices for commodities or services."
The further commentary on this line of argument is
"that the climax is arrived at when the inalienable right
to life, liberty and the pursuitof hafipinessis gravely asserted
to be a ground for refusing to enforce a statute like this;
and his conclusion is-and we believe it is a correct forecast
-that
"we s)hall be met hereafter with the necessary
deduction from these .opinions-a new canon of constitutional law, viz., that a statute interfering with 'natural
rights' must be shown to be authorized, not that it must
I
be shown to be prohibited."
To explain the position of the Court more fully. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no State shall
deprive any person of life,. liberty or property without due
process of law." These words, "due process of law," the"
Court would appear to think do not simply mean due as
expressed by. the Act of the State legislature. Only such
Acts are due as conform to those prizcibles of individual
liberty, miscalled "natural rights, ' which are expressed.
in such documents as the Magna Charta and the Declaration of Independence. The more particular development
of these fir2nciles is left for future cases. In the case
of Budd v. New. York they were impliedly held to
embrace the prohibition on the State from passing any
laws which (without, and perhaps with, compensation)
prohibited a person from selling his services -or goods at
such prices as he might desire.
It is not our purpose here to discuss the wisdom of the
particular application of this way of regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, but to discuss the general attitude
toward constitutional law and the interpretation of written
constitutions which leads to this way of regarding the
amendment, and the true meaning of the term "due

,
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process of law," to which attitude and method- of interpretation.Mr. McMinRrglE is so much opposed."

-

-

I -The habit of mind which makes one look at the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting the States from passing
lawis which our forefathers would have -called "against
hnatural justice, 'and we,in the stricter pa'rlafnce of modern
political science, call "against the first principles of civil
liberty," springs, we believe, from regarding Stafe.Cohstitutions as instruments for conferring, and not for taking away
ower. -For instance, Mr.- Justice BREWER, who wrote the
opini6n so much objected to by Mr. McMuRTlE in Budd
v. .New York, says, in State'v. Nemena Co. :1 "The
6bject of the constitution of a free government is to grant,
not to Withdraw, power. The habit of regarding the legislature ag inherently omnipotent, and looking upon what'
express restrictions the constitution has placed upon its
actioW, is dangerous and tends to error. Rather regarding
first those essential truths, those axioms of civil and political
liberty upon which all free governments are founded; and
secondly, statements in the bill of rights upon which the
governmental strtcture is reared, we may then properly
in.iuire what powers the words of the Constitution, the
terms of the grant convey.
This general attitude toward the interpretation of
State constitutions tends to give the widest possible meaning to the words, to be found in the Bill of Rights of nearly
all State constitutions, viz., "due process of law" or "the
law of the land." It leads to the broad meaning which
many would give this expression when they find it used in
the Coistitution of the United States as a prohibition against
the .State legislatures.
, The fundamental difference between some of the
members of the Supreme Court and Mr. McMURTRIE lies
in the difference in their way of looking at constitutional
law considered as creating safeguards of civil liberty against
encroachments on part of the States. It.
is the old controversy between the strict constructionist and the lib' 7 Kansas, pp. 54-5.
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eral constructionist transferred to a new field, and in
which many, as Mr. McMURTRIE, who is a staunch de-

fender of Federal power,' have changed sides. Just as men
like Chief Justice MARSHALL strove to give what they considered a reasonpable, and which we may call a liberal, construction of the po'vers of the Federal Government, so
to-day men like Mr. Justice BREWER endeavor to give a
similar liberal interpretation to all clauses designed to protect the individual against government, be that government
National or State.
The first century of the development of constitutional
law was so thoroughly taken up with the discussion of the
division of power-between the Federal and State governments, and individual and State rights were so confused by
the vast majority even of our best lawyers, that the principles of individual liberty were wholly neglected. The
words of the *Declaration of Independence were in the
mouths of all, but few seem to have reduced the principles
of civil liberty there only shadowed forth to any concrete'
form, and to all intents an d purposes they remained, and
largely remain to-day, what Mr. McMuRTRIE calls them,
"high-sounding phrases."
Thus it came to pass, as men thought little of the true
principles of civil liberty, that they accepted from the death
of Chief Justice MARSHALL, almost without question and as
an axiom of constitutional law, the formula that a State
legislature had all power not expressly taken away from it
by the Natioal or State Constitution.

Mr. McMuRTRIE'

speaks of a departure from that axiom in favor of broadening the sphere of civil liberty not only as unwise, but "as
a modern idea of constitutional law." It is our desire, in
the Editorial Notes for September and October, to take the
two questions raised by these two assertions up in -theirorder

and discuss them. We believe that the proper answer involves the next great question of constitutionallaw.
1 See his answer to Mr. BANCROFT, entitled Plea for the Supreme
Court.-Observations on Mr. GY4ORGi BANCROFT'S " Plea for the Constitution," in which he ably defends the final decision of the Court in the
legal tender cases.

